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ABSTRACT 
Official discourse in Singapore on social cohesion is often framed along the broad parameters of 
achieving racial and religious harmony. Many policies – formal and informal – and several laws evolved 
to manage these two aspects of society.  Yet, as Singapore developed and with a much more complex 
socioeconomic environment both domestically and externally, there is perhaps a need to re-look the 
discourse and framework for discussing social cohesion. This paper takes a critical look at how the issue 
of social cohesion is framed in academic literature and policy discussions in Europe and the OECD, and 
tries to develop a broader analytical framework that could be useful in the Singapore context as it 
struggles with the multiple fault lines in society (beyond race and religion) that have emerged in the 
last decade or so.   
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DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK ON SOCIAL COHESION 
IN SINGAPORE: REFLECTIONS FROM 
THE FRAMING OF SOCIAL COHESION 
DEBATES IN THE OECD AND EUROPE 
 
 
NURHIDAYAH HASSAN1 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The discourse surrounding social cohesion in 
Singapore has rarely strayed far from discussions 
about its multiculturalism2 and social integration. 
Until recently, class divides or other forms of 
divisions in society did not quite feature in the 
discourse. It is undeniable that multiculturalism, 
particularly relating to race or ethnicity and 
religion, is a defining aspect of Singapore and one 
of the most important building blocks of the 
country. The state’s management of the various 
ethnic communities in the country has been 
arguably rather successful for there has not been 
any form of ethnic-based violence since it achieved 
full independence in 1965. This achievement is 
often reiterated in formal narratives by the state’s 
leaders, a strong reminder to its citizens about the 
importance of social cohesion which is often 
framed as racial and religious harmony.  
 
Today, the relevance of social cohesion in the 
country is greater than before. The ramifications of 
globalisation, growing visibility of the different 
cleavages in society and increasing 
disenchantment with the government can all be 
                                                        
1 Nurhidayah Hassan is a graduate student at the Lee Kuan 
Yew School of Public Policy and was research intern at the 
EUC in July-August 2013. 
2 This paper espouses the term “multiculturalism” to reflect 
the diversity of cultures and peoples in Singapore. However, 
official discourse often uses the terms “multiracialism” and 
“multiculturalism” interchangeably and do not make explicit 
distinction between the two. Both have different 
connotations. Briefly, race is a category based on physical 
attributes, whereas culture is an “ethnic emblem” associated 
with language, religion, values and tradition (Lai 2004, 2).  
viewed as threats to social cohesion in Singapore. 
Hence, social cohesion goes beyond integration 
and racial harmony. There are multiple debates 
and discussions surrounding the conceptual 
meaning and practical application of the term 
‘social cohesion’. One of the primary objectives of 
this paper is to give clarity to its meaning and 
assemble an operational definition of the term in 
Singapore’s context. This paper will also analyse 
the current state of social cohesion in Singapore 
and the challenges it faces in fostering a more 
cohesive society. It endeavours to fill a gap in the 
depth of discussion around social cohesion in 
Singapore, by bridging the conceptual aspect of 
cohesion to policy formulation.  
 
Literature Review: Defining Social Cohesion  
 
The intellectualisation of the term ‘social cohesion’ 
can be traced back to over a century ago. In his 
highly influential book, “The Division of Labor in 
Society” (1893), eminent French sociologist Emile 
Durkheim postulated that solidarity formed the 
basis of social cohesion, at the same time 
acknowledging that the concept of cohesion was 
difficult to define or measure. He did, however, 
distil two important factors to social cohesion: 
shared loyalties and solidarity (Fenger 2012, 40). 
He theorised that two types of solidarity exist in 
society; mechanical solidarity, which refers to “the 
traditional uniformity of collective values and 
beliefs”; and organic solidarity, which is “the result 
of modern relationships between individuals who 
are able to work together while developing an 
autonomous and even critical personality with 
respect to tradition” (Ibid.) Over a century later, 
Durkheim’s ideas about the interdependence of 
people in society continue to stimulate the body of 
work surrounding social cohesion.   
 
To summarise the wide-ranging discourse on social 
cohesion, the discussions are divided into two 
perspectives; academic and policy-oriented (Chan, 
et al. 2006). The academic community has been 
able to shed some light on the theoretical 
underpinnings of social cohesion. In his book “The 
Limits of Social Cohesion: Conflict and Mediation in 
Pluralist Societies” (1998), Peter L. Berger 
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discusses the concept of social cohesion in terms 
of integration, identity and social stability. He 
analyses “normative conflicts” in societies (such as 
ethnic riots and clash of religious beliefs), and the 
types of formal institutions that can help to 
manage and resolve these conflicts. He attributes 
modernisation and “its normative freight” as the 
source of these conflicts which threaten social 
cohesion (Berger 1998, 352). Similarly, Gough and 
Olofsson (1999) made the linkage between social 
cohesion, integration and exclusion, and studied 
the relationship between these concepts. Both 
works by Berger and Gough and Olofsson have 
been criticised as providing “relatively few hints as 
to how social cohesion can be defined and 
operationalized” (Chan et al., 2006, 275).  
 
Social psychologists like Bollen and Hoyle (1990) 
also wrote extensively on the concept of 
“perceived cohesion” (in a group context), defining 
this term as “an individual’s sense of belonging to a 
particular group and his or her feelings of morale 
associated with membership in the group” (Bollen 
and Hoyle 1990, 482). They argue that the notion 
of perceived cohesion is integral to the theoretical 
understanding of social cohesion. The two 
dimensions that make up “perceived cohesion”, 
namely sense of belonging, and feelings of morale, 
are important for the endurance of the group and 
its members’ motivations (Ibid.).  Although Bollen 
and Hoyle’s work is geared towards group 
cohesion, their conceptualisation of the roles of 
sense of belonging and feelings of morale 
contribute another dimension to the overall 
understanding of social cohesion.  
 
While the academic discourse has succeeded in 
providing rich discussions on different dimensions 
and understanding of social cohesion, it is still 
lacking in terms of dealing with the operational 
dimension of social cohesion. Hence, recent 
studies have focused more on the policy-oriented 
aspect of social cohesion. The policy-oriented 
discourse on social cohesion have recently 
emerged due to the pressure on policymakers in 
seeking solutions to problems that have emerged 
as a result of global socio-economic changes, such 
as increased population mobility and diversity 
(Chan et al., 2006, 278). Easterly, Ritzan and 
Woolcock (2006) posit that social cohesion is 
extremely vital for political reforms, in that the 
citizens need to inherently trust their governments 
to devise and implement policies beneficial to the 
country. In addition, they contend that 
inclusiveness of the country’s institutions and 
communities are the building blocks of social 
cohesion (Easterly et al., 2006, 2). The Canadian 
government blazed the trail for mainstreaming 
social cohesion into policymaking, as a response to 
immigration and to promote multiculturalism 
(Spoonley et al., 2005, 89). After a series of 
“Structured Conversations” between policymakers 
and the civil society in 2002, the Canadian 
government released a report titled “A Canadian 
Roadmap to Social Cohesion” (Canadian Heritage 
2002), and defined social cohesion as “based on 
broad participation and inclusion….one in which 
diversity is understood as a strength and in which 
an infrastructure of accessible institutions supports 
the quality of life of all citizens” (Ibid., 5). The 
Canadian definition is strongly undergirded by 
notions of shared citizenship.  
 
On the other hand, the Council of Europe views 
cohesion primarily in social and economic terms, 
emphasising how government policies are key to 
the “tackling of the negative consequences of 
globalisation, such as the uneven distribution of 
economic, social and cultural goods within and 
between communities, and the marginalisation 
and social exclusion of certain groups within 
society.” (Council of Europe 2000, 12). The 
Council’s understanding of cohesion also sees 
social exclusion as an undesirable element of 
society; social cohesion is seen as solution to 
combat socio-economic disparities such as 
unemployment, lack of rights and deterioration of 
the quality of life (Spoonley et al., 2005, 90).  
 
Other inter-governmental organisations have also 
placed social cohesion high on their policy agendas. 
The OECD highlighted social cohesion as the key 
theme in its 2012 report, “Perspectives on Global 
Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting 
World”, detailing the importance of social 
cohesion for fast-developing economies. It defines 
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social cohesion in terms of a “well-ordered 
society” (OECD 2012, 53), and identifies three main 
components of social cohesion, namely social 
inclusion; social capital and social mobility. 
Through this framework, OECD argues that 
policymakers can deepen their understanding of 
social challenges and approach these issues in a 
more holistic manner, as opposed to treating them 
as separate matters. For example, instead of 
providing cash transfers for the poor, policymakers 
should think about ways of increasing the income 
of the poor through structured employment.  
 
In reviewing the various definitions and 
approaches to social cohesion, Joseph Chan et al. 
(2006) summarises the two perspectives on social 
cohesion as either employing a means-end 
approach or a pluralistic one. The authors claim 
that the means-end approach lacks the empirical 
evidence to show causality between conditions 
that supposedly promote cohesion, and social 
cohesion (Chan et al. 2006, 282). They also argue 
that the pluralistic approach treats social cohesion 
as a “catchword” to include all ills in society today, 
and fails to aid policymaking (Ibid., 288).  
 
Social Cohesion as a Multi-Dimensional Concept  
 
Hence, from the literature review above, it is 
evident that social cohesion is a multi-dimensional 
and complex concept that policy makers continue 
to grapple with. For the purpose of this paper, we 
will take an all-encompassing definition of social 
cohesion. It aims to integrate the fundamental 
ideas that have been addressed in both the 
academic arena and policy realm. This research will 
adopt a framework of social cohesion that can be 
operationalised and be used in a policymaking 
setting. This particular framework was first 
proposed by Menno Fenger (2012), who 
aggregated the different facets of social cohesion 
and distilled them into four different dimensions: 
 
1. Economic Dimension: This dimension 
focuses on the link between the 
economic health of a country and its 
state of social cohesiveness. Fenger 
states that “in cohesive societies, 
disparities are rather low.” (Fenger 
2012, 44). The logic behind this thinking 
is that cohesive societies result in better 
economic growth.  
2. Social Dimension: This is where the 
notion of social capital is introduced. 
Social capital refers to “the networks of 
relationships that people build to 
resolve common problems, obtain 
collective benefits or exercise a certain 
amount of control over the 
environment” (Ibid., 45). Spoonley et al. 
(2005) contend that social capital is a 
prerequisite to social cohesion (93), 
because cohesion demands cooperative 
interaction (that leads to networks) 
between citizens, which are essentially 
based on trust.  
3. Cultural Dimension: The cultural 
dimension highlights the “ideational 
component” (Ibid.) of social cohesion, 
one where society has shared values 
and a strong sense of belonging. 
4. Political Dimension: This particular 
dimension looks at how societies 
perform as political systems. Fenger 
believes that citizens in socially 
cohesive societies feel that they are 
politically active, and perceive their 
political involvement as important 
(Ibid.). The other feature of this 
dimension is citizens’ trust in their 
government and their perceptions of 
the system’s legitimacy.  
 
 
2. SOCIAL COHESION: THE CASE OF 
SINGAPORE  
 
The definition of a cohesive society in Singapore 
has not strayed far from its rarefied notion of 
multiculturalism as racial and religious harmony, 
credited for providing the “foundations for 
meaningful socio-economic and political 
development” (Tan 2004, 65). However, as this 
paper’s literature review has elucidated the 
concept of social cohesion runs deeper than 
notions of successful multiculturalism.  
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Nevertheless, with the current proliferation of 
ethnic strife in other parts of the region and the 
world, the successful management of the different 
ethnic communities in Singapore is exemplary. 
Since its colonial days, Singapore, as a trading port, 
was made up of peoples from Southeast Asia, 
China, India, Europe and various parts of the Malay 
Archipelago (Lai 2004, 4). However, there was little 
social interaction, much less integration, as the 
different ethnic communities lived in their 
designated enclaves. In addition, the colonial 
administration had largely adopted a divide-and-
rule policy, categorising the communities based on 
their labour capacities and assumed traits – for 
example, during the British Indian Rule era, the 
Malays were excluded from trading alliances with 
the British, whereas the Chinese, due to their 
fluency in various dialects and most importantly in 
English, were the British’s preferred strategic 
partners (Manap 2010, 50). In spite of this 
segregated approach, the different ethnic groups 
lived side by side in relative peace, with no 
significant conflict disrupting their harmony.  These 
ethnic communities had their respective social 
structures, leaderships, civic organisations and had 
stronger political allegiances to their native 
homeland (Lai 2004, 4). Singapore was merely a 
place for them to make a living, and the ruling 
colonial regime did not view them as political nor 
social threats (Ibid.).  
 
However, post-war developments stirred up 
political awareness within the respective ethnic 
communities, and various political movements 
started to rip through the country. The Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP), which had developed as 
an underground political organisation during the 
British rule, garnered significant support from the 
Chinese and was seen as a subversive force against 
the state (Lawson 2001). The MCP organised many 
labour strikes, and the most significant one was 
the Hock Lee Bus Strike in 1955, protesting against 
the poor working conditions of the bus drivers.  
 
In 1950, Singapore recorded its first incidence of 
“ethnic-based violence”, involving the case of 
Catholic-born Dutch girl Maria Hertogh, who was 
raised by a Malay-Muslim family and became a 
Muslim convert (Lawson 2007, 68). The custody 
battle between Maria’s biological Dutch parents 
and her Malay guardian had sparked off riots 
where the Malays (who protested against Maria’s 
parents’ custody rights) virtually attacked any 
European or Eurasian they encountered. This 
resulted in 18 deaths and 173 casualties (Ibid.). 
Nonetheless, the Malays’ political awareness only 
culminated during Singapore’s brief merger with 
Malaysia. Realising that they were a minority in a 
predominantly Chinese country, Singapore Malays 
demanded for privileged treatment as what their 
Malaysian counterparts were receiving from the 
Malaysian government (Lawson 2001). In 1964, 
this tension erupted in violent racial riots between 
the Malays and the Chinese, with the Singapore 
leaders accusing UMNO of invoking extremist 
tendencies amongst the Singapore Malays.  
 
To this day, the Maria Hertogh incident and the 
racial riots are frequently used in the official 
discourse and in school textbooks as a reminder to 
Singaporeans about the perils of non-integration, 
and the need to be sensitive and vigilant with 
regards to racial and religious tolerance. Schools 
celebrate an official Racial Harmony Day to 
commemorate 1964 racial riots and to promote 
inter-racial peace (Ministry of Education 2013).  
 
In the early years of its independence, and after its 
unsuccessful merger with Malaysia, the new 
Singapore government, led by Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew, quickly adopted a multiracial principle, 
emphasising the equality of all races3 (Tan 2004, 
67).  Driven by this ethos, the government 
developed a nation-building framework to instill a 
“Singaporean Singapore” (Ibid.) identity. Today, 
the country is made up of 74.1% Chinese, 13.4% 
Malay, 9.1% Indians, and 3.2% Others (Department 
of Statistics 2012). This equilibrium has remained 
relatively unchanged over the years.  One of the 
                                                        
3 In contradiction to the equality ethos developed by the 
Singapore government, Article 152 in the Constitution of 
Singapore recognises the “Minorities and Special Position of 
Malays” in the country. This is a symbolic move to 
acknowledge Malays as the indigenous people of the 
country, and according to Lee Kuan Yew (2009), this serves as 
a reminder that the government will always bear the 
interests of the Malays (and other minorities).  
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policies that falls under the rigorous CMIO 
(Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others) model is the 
bilingual policy of the country, whereby English is 
the chosen language of administration, business 
and education, and the ethnic mother tongues play 
a secondary (but necessary) role in official cultural 
and educational affairs (Tan and Ng 2011). This 
bilingual philosophy was underlined by the 
government’s drive to keep Singapore relevant in 
the international scene and to ensure the 
maintenance of its cultural roots (Tan 2004, 69).  
 
Critics argue that this method of “controlled 
ethnicity” is problematic as not only does it 
assume homogeneity under each broad racial 
category, it fails to see that such demarcation only 
serves to highlight stereotypical differences 
between each community (Tan 2004, Lawson 2007, 
Ooi 2005). However, the government insisted that 
the unravelling of its controlled ethnicity approach 
will produce perilous consequences and threaten 
social cohesion.    
 
In 1999, the government came up with another 
analogy to describe the Singapore’s brand of 
multiracialism. The overlapping circle conception 
sees each community being represented by a circle. 
The four circles representing the CMIO overlap one 
another and “what we can do is to maximise the 
overlapping area” (Goh, 1999).  He continued, “It is 
also not the Government’s policy to have the four 
overlapping circles merged into one.” (Tan 2004, 
74).  
 
While the government’s hegemony in framing 
racial and religious harmony has gone 
unchallenged in the past, globalisation, as well as a 
more relaxed immigration policy from 2000 to 
2010, has changed the country’s social, political 
and economic landscapes, and added more 
diversity into its demographic landscape. Old and 
new fault lines are beginning to emerge, and the 
increasing divide within each CMIO category plus 
the rising number of mixed marriages have 
exacerbated the complexities of Singapore’s 
multiracialism. It is therefore timely to review 
Singapore’s multicultural framework and discourse 
on social cohesion.  
Fault Lines in Singapore: Concealed Fractures 
Emerging  
 
Over the last forty years, Singapore’s rapid 
economic transformation has gained the Southeast 
Asian city worldwide recognition. Despite its lack 
of natural and human resources and land space, it 
has succeeded to be one of the most globalised 
cities in the world. The country’s swift 
transformation from a small trading port to a high-
income, global business hub has not only affected 
its economic climate, but also its social and 
political milieu. The unrelenting pursuit of growth 
has major ramifications on its society, creating new 
divergences and deepening some existing fault 
lines4 in the country.  
 
Influx of Immigrants   
 
Over the last decade, the thorny issue of 
immigrants has never failed to strike a chord with 
Singaporeans. It is possibly one of the most 
pressing issues now facing the country, as the 
presence of immigrants greatly impacts the 
country’s social cohesion on various dimensions. 
The recently published ‘Population White Paper’ 
released by the Singapore government5 triggered 
waves of anxiety throughout the country as it 
encapsulates the government’s plans to increase 
the rate of immigrants at 15,000 to 25,000 per 
year, to make up for the low fertility rate and to 
maintain the “economic vibrancy” of the city. At 
this heightened pace, the proportion of immigrants 
will make up almost half the population by 2020.  
 
In the last two to three years, Singaporeans have 
grown increasingly vocal about their unhappiness 
over the influx of immigrants. Their unhappiness 
stems from various reasons; having to face greater 
job competition, lack of social integration due to 
language and cultural differences, and the 
weakening of national identity (Yeoh and Lin 2012). 
                                                        
4 In 2012, PM Lee warned of new “fault lines” in Singapore, 
highlighting the need to resolve the tensions between new 
immigrants and Singaporeans (Asiaone 2012).  
5  National Population and Talent Division. 2013. “A 
Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore: A 
Population White Paper.” www.population.sg. Accessed 20 
February 2013.  
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The latest demonstration of their vexation with the 
government’s immigration policies was showcased 
during a rare mass protest against the Population 
White Paper (Yahoo Newsroom 2013), organised 
by the non-governmental organisation 
Transitioning – Unemployment Support Services 
(TUSS). This event garnered international media 
coverage as it is one of the country’s largest ever 
protest, with a massive turnout of around 4000 
people (Ibid.).  
 
Growing Income Inequality  
 
Singapore’s rise to become the world’s most 
affluent country 6  has come at the cost of 
increasing inequalities as reflected in the country’s 
Gini coefficient, which currently stands at a high of 
0.478 in 2012. (Straits Times 2013).7 Many in the 
lower income group also suffered a decline in real 
income or wage stagnation due to the heavy 
reliance on low-wage foreign labour. At the same 
time, the influx of the super rich and wealthy 
migrants, and the influx of “hot money” driving up 
property prices create resentment as income gap 
in the country widens (Asher and Nandy 2008; Tan 
2012).  
 
Although there is no extreme poverty in Singapore, 
the incidences of relative poverty are much more 
palpable. According to a recent study on inequality 
in Singapore, the second and third deciles (bottom 
20 and 30 percent) of employed households in 
Singapore earn between SGD 2,700 to 3,700, less 
than half of the country’s median income, which 
stands at SGD 7,570 (Bhaskaran et al. 2012). 
Income inequality impinges on social cohesion, and 
has grave consequences on society in general. How 
so? Firstly, income inequality affects social mobility, 
or an individual’s ability to improve his or her lives 
and status in society. This in turn affects social 
                                                        
6 In 2012, The Wealth Report, a worldwide study which takes 
a look at wealth ranks Singapore as the world’s richest 
country. Singapore’s per capita GDP stands at US$ 56, 532 
(Asiaone 2012).  
7 The Gini coefficient is the most common way of measuring 
income gaps in countries. A score of 0 indicates zero 
inequality and 1 indicates total inequality. Hong Kong ranks 
as Asia’s most unequal city at 0.537, and Norway has the 
lowest, at 0.256 (Shah 2013).  
cohesion, as the lack of mobility tends to produce 
groups of permanent underclasses, which can have 
negative ramifications on social cohesion (OECD 
2012). David Chan, Director of the Behavioral 
Sciences Institute, asserts that such class 
divisiveness leads to “perceptions of inequity, 
injustice, alienation, pessimism, envy and conflict” 
(Chan 2013). He believes that improving social 
mobility is crucial to Singapore’s social cohesion.  
 
Because of the systemic nature of inequality, it is 
no easy task conceiving solutions to tackle relative 
poverty, especially when this gap has an inherent 
class-race dimension to it (Lai 2004, 13). Clearly, 
more long-term, sustainable and integrated 
solutions are needed to address the issue of 
income inequality.  
 
Lack of Conflict Management Avenues   
 
As a society becomes more diverse, made up of 
several communities with different sets of values, 
beliefs and practices, conflict is to be expected. 
There is a greater need therefore to establish 
various institutions of conflict management, both 
formal and informal, to mediate and help resolve 
conflicts. Among many other things, cohesive 
societies are marked by the distinct presence of 
conflict management institutions (Lai 2004, 3).  
Berger (1998) argues that “mediating structures” 
are essential to “protect the individual from 
alienation” (363), but also warns that these 
institutions have the potential to polarise conflicts. 
There needs to be a balance of both formal and 
informal conflict management avenues.  
 
The Community Mediation Centre (CMC) was set 
up by the government in 1998, and the 
organisation has seen an average of 600 to 700 
cases per year, with 70 percent of the cases 
resolved (Chia 2013). These cases are conflicts 
which cannot be solved in courts, and are often 
between family members, neighbours and friends8. 
                                                        
8  A high profile case under the CMC which involved a 
Singaporean-Indian family and a China-born family was about 
the Chinese family’s unhappiness with the smell of curry 
emanating from the Indian family’s home. Singaporeans 
banded together, regarded this case as an undesirable effect 
EUC Working Paper No. 17 
 
8 
 
Besides the CMC, there are also a handful of 
alternative conflict management places, either 
non-profit organisations such as Eagles Mediation 
and Counselling Centre or the respective ethnic 
self-help groups such as Malay organisation, 4PM. 
Otherwise, these disputes either remain 
unresolved or end up in courts. Tan (2002) further 
argues that mediation in Singapore needs to have 
more “private or community-driven mediation 
services” because people tend to perceive formal 
mediation centres as government-linked and this 
can harm the mediation process and outcomes 
(Ibid., 299). The lack of alternative conflict 
management avenues is inextricably tied to the 
broader issue of weak civic consciousness in 
Singapore caused by the persistent encroachment 
of the state into multiple facets of its citizens’ lives 
(Lee 2005, 134). This “strong state, weak society,” 
condition, typical of authoritarian regimes, has 
impeded the growth of civil societies at large. As 
such, there is little room to cultivate the 
establishment of independent mediation centres.  
 
Policy Responses  
 
Since its independence, the Singapore government 
has conceived various policy solutions in an 
attempt to make the society more cohesive. This 
section analyses the government’s current and 
past efforts and identifies gaps between its 
cohesion aspirations and its policy responses. It 
utilises the four dimensions identified in the earlier 
section of this paper. These dimensions are 
inextricably related and will have overlapping 
issues.  
 
Economic Dimension  
 
This dimension focuses on the economic health of 
the country, and establishes that income 
disparities impact the state of cohesion. While 
Singapore’s economic growth has been admirable, 
leading it to be one of the most affluent countries 
in the world, its growth has not been equitable. To 
assist those who have not benefited from the 
growth of the country, the Singapore government 
                                                                                                
of immigration, and protested by organising a “Cook a Pot of 
Curry” day via social media (Lim 2011).   
has been rolling out various schemes to assist the 
low-income households.  
 
In response to calls urging the government to 
increase wages of low-income earners, the 
Workfare Income Supplement (WIS) was 
introduced in 2006 to assist those earning below 
S$1900, and above 35 years old (Central Provident 
Fund 2013). They receive annual payments ranging 
from S$1750 to S$4200, depending on their age, 
income and employment period. 40 percent of this 
payout is in cash, and the rest goes to their CPF 
accounts (Ibid.). Critics (Tan 2012, Asher and 
Nandy 2008, Hui 2013) dispute the long-term 
effectiveness of WIS in addressing the income gap, 
as it gives firms an incentive to continue to 
suppress the wages of low-income workers. This 
scheme has cost the government S$1.2 billion from 
2006 to 2010 (Hui 2013, 116).  
 
Other efforts to alleviate the financial burden of 
the low-income include the GST voucher scheme9, 
income tax concessions and various subsidised 
training programmes10 to help workers upgrade 
their skills. Again, the sustainability and 
effectiveness of these efforts have been disputed, 
as they do not impact the wages of low-income 
earners in the long run. This is also an indication 
that the Singapore government does not intend to 
change its general position against universal 
welfare state, but instead would focus on more 
targeted measures to help those who are in need.   
 
The key concern is that if the country’s income gap 
continues to grow, it will deepen existing class 
divides, putting the social fabric of our society at 
risk. Although it is difficult to determine the causal 
relationship between income inequalities and 
social cohesion, these two elements are 
inextricably related. According to the European 
Commission (in its Third Report on Economic and 
                                                        
9 The GST voucher scheme aims to aid low-income families by 
offsetting the Goods and Services Tax (GST) they pay through 
cash handouts, CPF top ups or rebates (GST Voucher 2013).  
10 The Workforce Development Agency (WDA) has initiated a 
Workfare Training Support (WTS) Scheme which 
complements the WIS. It provides grants to employers to 
train older workers and other forms of assistance to aid older 
workers upgrade their skills (Ministry of Manpower 2012).  
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Social Cohesion), “Maintaining social cohesion is 
important not only in itself but for underpinning 
economic development which is liable to be 
threatened by discontent and political unrest if 
disparities within society are too wide.” (Fenger 
2012, 44). In other words, it is implied that the 
smaller the gaps are in society, the more cohesive 
the society could be. Fenger goes on to argue that 
GDP growth and productivity tend to benefit from 
greater cohesiveness (Ibid.). Therefore, the 
economic dimension is an important one that the 
government cannot afford to ignore when 
addressing social cohesion. 
  
Social Dimension  
 
Under the social dimension, we need to examine 
two inter-related issues – social capital and social 
mobility. Social capital is widely viewed as a 
prerequisite to social cohesion (Spoonley 2005, 93). 
Briefly, social capital can be defined as “the 
resources that people have potential access to 
from being connected to others possessing those 
resources” (Chua 2010, 3). These social resources 
come from relations such as marriage ties, family 
connections, alumni networks and so on. Harvard 
professor Robert Putnam established that social 
capital can only be gained when there is trust 
between people, who are then committed to 
sharing resources in common endeavours (Putnam 
1995). Trust is necessary for a cohesive society.  
 
Singapore prides itself on being a meritocratic 
society, where there are equal opportunities for 
everyone, regardless of their ethnicity or religion 
(Tan 2004, 77). Each individual has the same 
chance at being successful based on his merit. 
While meritocracy in Singapore has been 
institutionalised as way of governance (Tan 2008, 
7), it has many inherent contradictions. In 
Singapore, the definition of ‘merit’ is too narrow, 
and is purely based on one’s academic 
achievements and occupation. In addition, 
Kenneth Paul Tan (2008) contends that 
meritocracy tends to obscure how institutions (like 
the education system) can “reproduce and 
reinforce class stratification and how people can 
be systematically and indirectly excluded from 
mainstream society, economy and politics because 
of their race, gender, sexuality, age, and class” (10). 
Earlier this year, Deputy Prime Minister Tharman 
Shanmugaratnam admitted that while meritocracy 
has brought much success to Singapore, it is time 
to have a broader definition of the term, to 
recognise diverse strengths and talents (Chan 
2013).  
 
Another contradiction of meritocracy is that it 
discounts the role that social capital plays in 
determining one’s life chances. Meritocracy 
disregards the fact that one can reach great 
successes not just by the virtue of his merits, but 
also through the exploitation of his social capital. 
Hence, due to the varying degrees of social capital 
that one possesses, he has a different starting 
point in a meritocratic environment. For example, 
parents from low-income households would have 
less financial and non-financial resources (social 
capital) to pass on to their children, as compared 
to wealthier families. The child from the wealthier 
family would have a greater chance at being 
successful due to both the financial means and 
social capital that his parents have provided him 
with.  
 
In a study assessing the role of social capital and 
inequality in Singapore, Chua (2010) found that 
race and gender have tangible consequences on an 
individual’s access to social capital, which in turn 
affect their social mobility. He concluded that 
Malays, as a minority group, due to their poor 
socio-economic status and their perceived 
negative attributes, do not accumulate social 
capital as well as the Chinese (Ibid., 20). He also 
found that women having to juggle dual roles at 
home and the workplace do not have as much 
social capital at their male counterparts (Ibid.). 
These findings strongly indicate the numerous 
limitations of the country’s meritocracy ethos.  
 
Nevertheless, the government does acknowledge 
the importance of social capital. In particular, 
bridging social capital, which refers to connections 
between different groups of people, is often 
viewed as positive towards creating the sense of 
social inclusion (Schuller, Baron and Field 2000). 
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The government has attempted to harvest bridging 
social capital through various means, to not only 
maintain racial harmony, but also with the goal of 
getting each community to share resources with 
one another.  
 
The oft-debated Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP),11 
was implemented to ensure that no ethnic 
enclaves were formed (HDB 2013). The 
government attributed the EIP as an enabling 
factor of integration and racial harmony. With the 
EIP in place, Resident Committees (RCs) within 
each housing estate were then –given the task “to 
promote neighbourliness, racial harmony and 
community cohesiveness amongst residents” 
(People’s Association 2009). Today, there are 572 
RCs within all housing estates in Singapore. 
 
Along the same vein, the National Integration 
Council (NIC) was established in 2009 to encourage 
locals and immigrants to interact. With four 
distinct platforms (Community, Schools, Media and 
Workplace) the Council runs socialisation and 
educational activities to encourage understanding 
and integration among the various communities 
(NIC 2010).  
 
All these initiatives have been developed by the 
government in a bid to boost the society’s bridging 
social capital. Despite these efforts, a recent 
survey by a local community organisation on racial 
and religious harmony in Singapore showed that 
only one in two Singaporeans have friends outside 
of their ethnic community (Aripin 2013). This 
signals the need for a deeper understanding of 
social capital, and how it is being generated, 
transferred and manifested. Without social capital 
underpinning the development of cohesion in 
society, the “cohesion” in Singapore will only exist 
                                                        
11 The Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) espouses the CMIO 
framework for the allocation of HDB units, maintaining the 
same proportion of ethnic groups across all housing estates, 
similar to the national proportion. In practical terms, it 
means that a Chinese house owner can only sell his flat to a 
Chinese, and a Malay to another Malay and so on. Property 
owners see this as burdensome as “buyers will be denied 
their ideal flat and sellers their ideal price” (Chin and Vasu 
2010, 2).  
at a superficial level that may not withstand the 
test of time.  
 
Cultural Dimension 
 
The cultural dimension is essentially the 
“ideational component” of social cohesion, 
emphasizing shared values and sense of belonging 
of a society. To this end, the Singapore 
government has laid down five sets of values as 
guiding pillars for its people: nation before 
community, and society above self; family as the 
basic unit of society; community support and 
respect for the individual; consensus not conflict; 
and racial and religious harmony (Tan 2012). These 
values, as proposed in 1988 by then Deputy Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong, largely emphasised the 
subordination of individual rights and interests to 
national interests.  
 
These communitarian values remain relevant in 
Singapore today, but as society changes, there is a 
need to reassess what these values have evolved 
into. Fenger (2012) reiterates that developing 
shared values is an “ongoing process” (45) that 
depends largely on trust and hope, and requires 
active community engagement. As such, the 
government initiated a large-scale, ambitious 
project titled “Our Singapore Conversation” (OSC), 
involving multiple dialogue sessions with over 
47,000 Singaporeans over a period of less than a 
year.  
 
These dialogues aimed at engaging Singaporeans 
on what their concerns and aspirations are, 
centred on nation-building themes such as building 
a caring and compassionate society, providing 
affordable healthcare and equal opportunities for 
Singaporeans (Ng 2013). While “naysayers” were 
skeptical about the OSC and dismissed it as a mere 
“one-off talk shop”, others believed that the OSC 
had also opened opportunities for citizens to 
engage each other, and looked towards translating 
some of these dialogues into action. For example, 
the Education Minister (also the Chairman of the 
OSC) Heng Swee Keat, revealed that there will be 
changes to the Primary School Leaving 
Examination (PSLE), which has been a source of 
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undue stress for Singaporean parents and children 
as conveyed during the OSC dialogues (Chang 
2013).  
 
Hence, in building a cohesive society, it is vital to 
build a framework of “accepted values and 
institutions” (Fenger 2012, 45) that is within reach 
of every member of society. Despite the skepticism 
surrounding OSC, it is nevertheless a positive 
starting point in cultivating a stronger sense of 
Singapore’s shared values, as articulated by 
Singaporeans.   
 
Political Dimension  
 
This particular dimension looks at how societies 
perform as political systems, in particular, the level 
of political participation by its people, and the 
relationship between government and people, and 
the level of trust of public institutions. Under this 
dimension, a cohesive society is one where the 
citizens intrinsically trust their government and its 
system’s legitimacy. Singapore, being an “illiberal 
democracy” (Mutalib 2000), limits most, if not all, 
of the policy making activities within the aegis of 
the government. However, over the last two 
decades, the government has loosened its grip and 
allowed a certain degree of political liberalisation, 
giving more space for involvement by civic society 
(Ortmann 2012, 165).  
 
In the 1990s, the government co-opted members 
of non-governmental organisations such as 
MENDAKI, SINDA and Consumers Association of 
Singapore (CASE) to be part of policy dialogues and 
processes (Ibid., 175). Even though the 
government had created these organisations, they 
were previously distanced from the policymaking 
process. The government’s strategy was clear – the 
purpose of including these groups in the process is 
not to challenge the government, but to simply to 
“promote the idea of the civic sphere” (Ibid.). A 
Speaker’s Corner was also established as an open 
space where individuals and organisations can 
voice their political opinions, albeit under tight 
regulations. In addition, the government still 
maintains the Internal Security Act (ISA), a piece of 
legislation that has been accused of being a tool to 
deter and remove political dissent.   
 
In recent years, largely aided by the advent of 
social media, policy advocacy and political 
participation has been more dynamic, affecting the 
results of the watershed 2011 General Elections, 
where the ruling party PAP, won by the smallest 
margin it has ever seen since 1959 (Ortmann 2011). 
The clamour for more political participation was 
very much related to the perception that 
government had failed to address discontent on 
issues such as the influx of immigrants, rising cost 
of living and general dissatisfaction with the 
direction the government is leading Singapore. The 
Internet has aided in the democratisation of 
information for Singaporeans, providing them with 
political views omitted in state-controlled 
mainstream media. However, the government has 
taken several steps to keep tabs on online media. 
It has gazetted socio-political blogs such as The 
Online Citizen, and has recently issued a new 
internet licensing regulations. These two moves 
are extremely unpopular with the online 
community, and the latest regulation triggered an 
online and offline protest called “Free My 
Internet” (Wong 2013). The new Internet licensing 
regulation requires licensees to put up a S$50,000 
performance bond and they would have 24 hours 
to take down content that the government deems 
offensive (Ibid). Nevertheless, the impact these 
regulations have on the wider electorate remains 
to be seen.  
 
Still, there is a trust deficit between Singaporeans 
and the government that could be a cause of 
concern for the ruling party. In a recent trust 
survey conducted by the Edelman Trust Barometer 
shows that only 23 percent of Singaporeans trust 
their government leaders, but 76 percent trust the 
government as an institution (Hansen 2013). This 
trust deficit may not bode well for the incumbent 
government and its pursuit of a cohesive society.  
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Discussion of the Four Dimensions in Singapore
  
As all four dimensions are closely related with 
significant overlapping issues in each dimension, it 
is difficult to single out which is the weakest 
dimension in Singapore. For example, due to the 
race-class overlap identified in the growing income 
gap issue in Singapore, the social and economic 
dimensions are inherently correlated. While these 
relationships do not imply causality, policy makers 
need to be fully cognizant that issues under a 
particular dimension will have ramifications on the 
other dimensions. This means that the unraveling 
of one dimension will undoubtedly have a severe 
impact on society as a whole. This requires greater 
policy coherence where impacts from policy trade-
offs have to be closely monitored and minimised 
where possible. The following section will 
elaborate greater on policy coherence and its 
importance.  
 
 
3. DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK ON SOCIAL COHESION IN 
SINGAPORE 
 
Identifying the causality of social cohesion is a 
complex affair since many social, political and 
economic issues are inextricably linked to each 
other. This is not unique to Singapore. It is 
important to have a systematic way of analysing 
social cohesion, especially in understanding the 
impact of policies on social cohesion. Observing 
the sheer complexities that challenge social 
cohesion in today’s Singapore society, there is a 
need for policymakers to develop an analytical 
framework that acknowledges the multi-
dimensional nature of social cohesion.  
 
The Importance of an Analytical Framework  
 
The existence of a multi-dimensional analytical 
framework would allow for a more robust analysis 
of cohesion in Singapore, which thus leads to 
better policy formulation. It also facilitates the 
monitoring of policies in order to ensure and 
enhance their effectiveness. An analytical 
framework would also boost policy coherence. The 
OECD defines policy coherence as “the systematic 
promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions 
across government departments and agencies 
creating synergies towards achieving the agreed 
objectives” (OECD 2003). This means that all 
stakeholders involved in reinforcing social 
cohesion in Singapore must work together to 
minimise the fault lines in society and come up 
with sustainable solutions to tackle those issues. 
The existence of an analytical framework can 
bolster this process and synergy.  
 
The development of this framework also comes 
with the acceptance that the government will have 
to give up a degree of its hegemony and possess 
the political will to extend the remit of 
policymaking to its corresponding stakeholders – 
opposition politicians, academics, entrepreneurs, 
civil society and even citizens. These stakeholders 
play a vital role in the process of building the 
framework. In addition, policy coherence also 
means that there will be significant trade-offs in 
the attempt to achieve a unified objective. For 
instance, should the government decide to 
implement a minimum wage policy (to address the 
issue of income gap) to increase the income of 
local low-wage workers, it would also have to 
tighten its foreign labour policies to help level the 
playing field for local workers. This move would 
nonetheless hurt many SMEs in the short run. 
Hence, the government could look at tax 
exemptions or other short-term measures to 
temporarily ease business costs for SMEs. Policy 
coherence is a fine balancing act as it manages 
conflicting interests amongst different 
stakeholders.  
 
Building a Framework  
 
Before tackling the critical task of developing a 
framework, the term “social cohesion” needs to be 
defined, taking into account its multi-dimensional 
nature, and also considering Singapore’s context. 
While it is not the purpose of this paper to offer a 
specific definition for Singapore, there are several 
requirements that policymakers can take note of 
when defining the term: 
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1) Trust and a sense of belonging are two 
major components of social cohesion. 
2) Social cohesion is not a system of ideology 
like liberalism or conservatism. It may not 
also necessarily imply diversity or tolerance. 
For example, a society marked by rigid 
social hierarchies and strict respect for 
traditions (hence it is neither diverse nor 
tolerant) could be highly cohesive because 
its social cohesion is dependent on these 
values (hierarchy and tradition).  
3) Social cohesion is a state of society, and not 
a process. Therefore social cohesion is not 
a means to an end and should not be 
equated to concepts of poverty reduction, 
inclusion etc. These concepts are 
interlinked, but not necessarily equivalent.  
 
(Chan, et al. 2006)  
 
 
 
 
After reaching a consensus on the definition, it is 
important to now understand the causal links 
between policies, social cohesion and the 
outcomes. At this juncture, many pertinent 
questions ought to surface: What are the inputs 
and outcomes of social cohesion? Are there 
intervening factors leading to social cohesion? 
What are the causal links between policies and 
social cohesion? What are the consequences of 
diminishing social cohesion? (Jeannotte et al., 
2002). These questions need to be addressed in 
order to begin drafting an analytical framework for 
social cohesion. Again, this paper does not intend 
to formulate a working framework, rather it simply 
recommends the conception of one. An example of 
a comprehensive causal framework comes from 
the Department of Canadian Heritage (see Fig. 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Causal Links between Social Cohesion and Social Outcomes 
 
 
 
Source: Jeannotte et al. 2002, 25 
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This model attempts to map the causal links of 
social cohesion, and demonstrates the impact of 
social cohesion on various outcomes like economic 
performance, security and community well-being. 
It highlights how social cohesion and positive 
outcomes “reinforce each other in a virtuous 
cycle” (Ibid., 26). It also shows how a change in one 
policy can impact another component of the 
model.  
 
Another analytical model developed by Menno 
Fenger (2012) also emphasises the multi-
dimensional complexities of social cohesion (see 
Fig. 2). This model reflects the four dimensions 
that were examined in the Singapore context and 
explains the impact of different types of policies on 
social cohesion and its correlation to the structural 
characteristics of a city and indicators that 
measure the quality of life in that particular city. 
These indicators could be poverty levels, crime 
rates, level of integration, etc.  It is important to 
have clarity on what is being measured, as it 
affects the choice of indicators (Council of Europe 
1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Analytical Framework for Studying Social Cohesion Policies 
 
 
Source: Menno Fenger, 2012, 52 
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One could also look at the efforts of other societies 
in trying to operationalise the concept of social 
cohesion. The European Commission financed a 
project to develop an analytical tool to measure 
social cohesion in the European Union (EU) 
countries (Berger-Schmitt 2000). Taking the EU’s 
context into account, the two goal dimensions of 
social cohesion are to reduce disparities, 
inequalities and social exclusion, and to strengthen 
the social capital of a society (Ibid., 8). With these 
goal dimensions identified, the concept of social 
cohesion is measured using the European System 
of Social Indicators, which is currently being 
developed (Ibid., 7). These indicators cover 14 life 
domains, such as population, housing, transport, 
education and social security. The dimensions are 
then divided into sub-dimensions which will be 
measured by different indicators. For a brief 
snapshot of this process, see Fig. 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Dimensions and Indicators of Social Cohesion in a European System of Social Indicators – 
A Snapshot 
 
GOAL DIMENSION MEASUREMENT 
DIMENSION 
SUBDIMENSION INDICATORS 
1. Reduction of 
disparities, inequalities 
and social exclusion 
   
- Social exclusion Social isolation Objective social 
inclusion 
Percentage of 
people with rare 
social contacts 
outside the 
household 
Subjective social 
inclusion 
Percentage of 
people who feel 
lonely 
2. Strengthen social 
capital 
   
- Availability of 
social relations 
Existence of 
personal relations 
Relations to 
relatives 
Existence of close 
relatives 
 Source: Berger-Schmitt 2000, 12 
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Since there are existing national-level datasets in 
Singapore, the EU indicator approach can be 
adopted to operationalise a social cohesion index 
for the country, based on the four dimensions 
identified earlier – economic, social, cultural and 
political. These existing datasets include, but are 
not limited to: 
 
 
Information  Source  
Population Census  Department of Statistics 
Singapore  
 
The Singapore Social 
Health Project (under 
development) 
 
National Volunteer and 
Philanthropy Centre  
Labour Wages Report  Ministry of Manpower  
 
Labour Force in 
Singapore 
Ministry of Manpower  
 
National Health Survey 
 
Ministry of Health 
Annual Crime Brief  Singapore Police Force 
 
Indicators for Racial and 
Religious Harmony 
Institute of Policy 
Studies, Onepeople.sg  
 
Social Markers of 
Integrations  
Institute of Policy 
Studies  
  
 
 
Limitations and Other Issues  
 
One of the key strengths of having an analytical 
framework is that it aids evidence-based 
policymaking, as opposed to crisis-driven policies 
(Jeannotte et al., 2002, 30). However, having a 
sound analytical framework, no matter how robust, 
is not a silver bullet for the myriad of issues 
present in society.  
 
Also, a host of capacity issues can arise throughout 
the process of developing this framework. While 
there are existing datasets that can be sourced, 
these large bodies of information require skilled 
analysts to fully “harvest” them. Moreover, as 
mentioned in previous sections, this development 
requires the cooperation and synergy of various 
government and non-government agencies, which 
in itself is a complicated and expensive 
undertaking. Nevertheless, quality research 
deserves deep commitment, especially since such 
an investment is dedicated towards building a 
more cohesive society 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
The objective of this paper was to take a critical 
look at the state of social cohesion in Singapore, 
and to recommend the development of an 
analytical framework to assess policies that can 
foster cohesiveness. Through its strategy of 
“controlled ethnicity”, Singapore has managed to 
avoid ethnic-based violence after experiencing a 
series of racial riots in the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, its rapid economic growth, coupled with 
the impact of globalisation has caused certain fault 
lines in the country to deepen. The growing 
income gap and the influx of immigrants are some 
key cleavages in the country that call for deeper 
understanding of their roots causes and 
implications.  
 
This paper has also studied the government policy 
responses to these issues based on four domains – 
economic, social, cultural and political. It is 
concluded that it is hard to single out the weakest 
dimension in Singapore since all the dimensions 
are inter-related. The unraveling of one dimension 
could have a significant impact on the others. 
Therefore policy coherence becomes an important 
pursuit of policymakers, and the existence of an 
analytical framework can aid this objective. There 
are several existing frameworks being used by the 
European Commission, the Department of 
Canadian Heritage, and other governments. The 
Singapore government can adopt one to suit the 
country’s context and priorities, and tap on 
existing data to further understand the state of 
social cohesion in the country.  
 
▪
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